Adrian P 🇷🇴🇺🇦🇪🇺

Russians claim they captured soldiers seen earlier in a video with photos of Syrskyi and Zelensky. However, it's unclear if the video was filmed beforehand. Cyber Boroshno says the uploader regularly submits Skala materials early. I've deleted the posts pending verification.

A few more expanded thoughts on the current situation. I'll start from a distance and gradually move toward the center of the issue. We live in an era where the battlefield evolves so rapidly that if you fall out of the information cycle for even 6–12 months, you'll be shocked by how much has changed. New technologies emerge, geopolitical balances shift, financial situation changes, producing a completely different battlefield dynamics. In such an environment, you need people who can not only adapt quickly, but also systematize those changes and, far more importantly, implement them. Mykhailo Fedorov was one such minister. Within months, he helped introduce several adaptations that had a tangible impact on the battlefield. Unfortunately, this kind of talent is rare. Yet perhaps even more important than the practical results was the hope he brought to the troops. Hope that things could improve. Hope that change was possible. Hope that someone at the top understood that yesterday's solutions would not solve tomorrow's problems. This hope was not baseless. It was actively helping shape the conditions for victory. Now let's zoom out from the Ministry of Defense and look at the broader picture. Since 2023, I have consistently argued against promoting General Syrskyi to the position of Commander-in-Chief. Even back then, as commander of the Ground Forces and the Khortytsia operational grouping, he was displaying three major flaws that, in my view, outweighed his strengths. The first was an unwavering top-down approach to command. In this system, even sergeants are not treated as independent tactical decision-makers but as instruments for enforcing the will of higher command. It is a model commonly associated with the worst traditions of the Russian military. Such systems tend to produce higher losses, lower morale, and an environment that can only be sustained through coercion and, in some cases, physical abuse. A brigade commander who refuses to impose such practices is seen as weak and is eventually replaced by someone more willing to enforce "iron discipline," regardless of the human cost. The second was the systematic construction of a network of loyal officers throughout the Armed Forces. Like many senior figures in politics or military institutions, Syrskyi built a power base. However, in this case, it reached unusually high levels. Officers whose loyalty was unquestioned advanced through the system, while individuals perceived as potential rivals or threats were marginalized. The story surrounding General Drapatyi is one example. Cases involving units such as Skelya, the 155th Brigade, and the Assault Troops under Man'ko further illustrate the consequences of such a system. When loyalty becomes the primary criterion, even poor decisions can be executed without meaningful opposition. And when problems emerge at lower levels, the mechanisms described in the first point ensure they rarely travel upward. The third was a strong resistance to systemic change. This is largely an extension of the previous two points. Individuals who proposed new approaches, new structures, or new ways to break the operational deadlock were often viewed not as assets but as threats. A loyal network of officers can then create an environment where reformers are either pushed out, sidelined, or forced to leave on their own. Unfortunately, it appears that Fedorov managed to irritate many entrenched interests. This likely included individuals within the Ministry of Defense involved in procurement, traditionally one of the most corruption-prone areas of government, as well as figures within the military command structure itself. After all, from their perspective, who is this civilian in his thirties to interfere in matters they consider exclusively military? This brings us to the core issue. General Syrskyi does not possess the formal authority to appoint or dismiss ministers. However, because of his loyalty to the Presidential Office, his extensive network of loyal officers, and his willingness to execute virtually any task assigned to him, his opinion carries significant weight. Apparently, together with other influential figures who are deeply uncomfortable with change, that weight proved greater than the benefits Fedorov had brought. Ultimately, however, the decision belongs to the President. Whether to remove Fedorov, whether to retain Syrskyi, whether to continue along the current path, those are presidential decisions. Responsibility therefore rests with him. And that brings us to a more uncomfortable point. Despite the concentration of power created by wartime conditions, President Zelensky has often shown an ability to hear public opinion. He reacted to public pressure over NABU. He has, on multiple occasions, adjusted course when political pressure became too great to ignore. Yet power has a tendency to influence even the most disciplined individuals. No one is entirely immune to it. Years of authority, especially authority exercised under extraordinary circumstances, can slowly distort one's judgment and narrow the range of voices one is willing to hear. I continue to support the President and believe he should remain in office in accordance with the Constitution. But I am increasingly concerned by the direction in which some decisions are pointing. It is a road that begins with good confidence in one's own judgment, but can gradually evolve into something else entirely. A road well known from the myth of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun