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Well-compiled article on the KSS-N nuclear-powered submarine. To add a point, the development and deployment of a high-value platform require strong commitment and consistency from the government, the military, and the defense industry. Given the progression through the stages of feasibility study, preliminary design, detailed design, and construction (with the program soon entering the detailed design phase) it is clear that the government, military, and industry are advancing the KSS-N with remarkable speed and adherence to the original plan. While the ROK Navy already possesses a formidable submarine fleet and the capability to project long-range missile power, its sudden announcement of a nuclear-powered submarine program (which is already well underway) might strike some as abrupt. This progress is the result of decades of quiet, coordinated effort by the government, the military, and industry. However, as with everything in this world, there is a shadow for every light, and every choice carries its own consequences. Although the "official" unveiling of the KSS-N program has sparked some concerns regarding the need for new infrastructure and the procurement of nuclear fuel, these challenges will ultimately be resolved. The necessary technological and industrial alignment has already been secured internally; in any case, the public and the media remain unaware of the program's specific internal status, as such details are shared only among the Office of the President, the ADD, top military leadership, and key industrial partners. So, the core issue is that the program (a factor that necessitated its formalization) entails such significant costs that a dedicated budget must be allocated, with the likelihood that further funding increases will be required. Due to the program, the Army and the Air Force will likely need to exercise restraint regarding "major" new programs (at least those not yet in the production phase) for a period of roughly seven years, between 2026 and 2035. (It should also be noted that the budget required for a lead ship is typically 20–50% higher than that for subsequent vessels in a class.) Fortunately, both the Army and the Air Force have already taken delivery of their core systems, meaning there are unlikely to be any significant new procurement requirements for the time being. While it is standard practice for each military branch to have its own separate budget, and it is certain that the KSS-N program will place an additional burden on the overall defense budget, this program will likely involve highly classified technical and financial arrangements, much like the separate budgetary allocations previously identified during parliamentary audits for the development and production of strategic and quasi-strategic missiles, as well as the KMPR strategy. The KSS-N is envisioned to be comparable in size to the U.S. Navy's Virginia-class Block IV or V submarines (with a light displacement of over 8,000 tons and a full-load displacement exceeding 9,500 tons). It will be equipped with advanced capabilities, including a next-generation nuclear reactor and a substantial arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles.