DECENTRALIZED WALKER 🕊️

Part 2 *Before the heist, a rehearsal was carried out on a separate Solana token.* On October 5, 2025, wallets associated with the early buyers (A and B) and the team wallets traded another token called Windows1995.Fun. Token address: "7SmGdLPRsHYQSdaeJwQs3KC9eZyp2B3oYUejZp4wpump" This was a largely inactive token that had reportedly been dead since April 2025, with only 225 trades across four days. Yet between 6:08 PM and 6:13 PM, seven wallets connected to the investigation traded it in a five-minute window. The sequence began with a feeder wallet at 6:08:07 PM, followed by a team wallet at 6:08:37 PM, Early Buyer B at 6:08:52 PM, another profitable trader at 6:10:54 PM, Early Buyer A at 6:11:12 PM, another team wallet at 6:12:01 PM, and a fourth profitable trader at 6:12:36 PM. This shows that Szymanski carefully rehearsed the planned fraud before the vibecoin pump. This strengthens the allegation of coordination because it provides a connection between the team's wallet and the early buying wallets. The Early buyers (A and B) later sent money to Szymanski's disclosed Binance Address. *Additional proof that Szymanski owns both exchange accounts.* Both exchange accounts were opened the same day and received their first deposit from the same wallet address BZZpcbaXQ3EFLHv5EL65L1zgbnwrRDV8rgsKgPxD64Wd The Binance deposit address (Dc9K1LSwMMTjPuWkYa3SJaQCXP16S3Ad9FPo1GGaie7s) was first used on 15 Dec 2023 at 03:44. The Bitget deposit address (4dfSULczR2CR6ne8siALZXtygdTugw1VGxgEra1HMeLN) was first used the same day at 06:58, three hours later. The same set of wallets sends funds to both exchange accounts, the 1. Early buyers (wallet A & B) that stole $17,600 2. Their funding wallet 3. The team's collection wallet (Published by Szymanski) 4. The team allocation wallets All transferred funds to both Binance and Bitget wallets. Therefore, one party holds both accounts. Onchain Evidence Bitget Exchange address solscan.io/account/4dfSUL… Binance Exchange Address solscan.io/account/Dc9K1L…

*How Szymanski (@Szymansk_ii) and his TEAM rug-pulled and scammed the community of $23,000 (₦34,500,000)and concealed it, through the Vibecoin token* Szymanski and people connected to the Vibecoin team orchestrated a deceptive scheme to profit from their own community while hiding behind separate wallets and a misleading transparency report. This is not an accusation based on rumours. It is based on an on-chain investigation tracing wallet activity, token sales, and money transfers. On October 13, 2025, two wallets purchased Vibecoin just before a major buying wave began at 10:00 AM Nigerian time. The first wallet (A): "7HG8BvtDKdUC3R97daPGhwcTTMtGPPYExLPwEFsooxZZ" Bought at 9:58:31 AM and made approximately $8,900 in profit. The second wallet (B): "8QduNBEbJzeFWH9siDmAKrYFmKvLwjA3gEepoX3uRH26" Bought at 9:58:39 AM and made approximately $8,700 in profit. Both wallets were funded by the same address: "D35HbRh89q9yt53NuV8MrF8Zq2XdzyZnzp5pXBcrncuV" They bought seconds apart, just before the pump, and sold at the top. Together, they made approximately $17,600. *Now here is where the deception becomes apparent.* Both wallets transferred their proceeds to the same Bitget deposit address that also received money from Szymanski's disclosed team collection wallet. The Bitget address: "4dfSULczR2CR6ne8siALZXtygdTugw1VGxgEra1HMeLN" The first buyer transferred 45.95 SOL at 10:47 AM, just one minute after its final sale. The second buyer transferred 43 SOL at 11:04 AM and another 2.48 SOL at 2:33 PM. The address subsequently forwarded the funds to Bitget's hot wallet, proving that this is a Bitget exchange address. *But the most important connection is that Szymanski's disclosed collection wallet:* "AeRbLUciEevs849GPGrAp6uySfmMiSNJedkuUDyjRJAP" Also transferred a combined 4.1 SOL to that same Bitget address on December 14, 2025, and February 22, 2026. The wallets that profited from buying before the pump and Szymanski's own disclosed team wallet were sending money to the same Bitget destination. That shared destination is a documented financial connection. And that is not the only connection. *The Binance address Szymanski publicly acknowledged* Szymanski also identified this Binance receiving wallet as his: "Dc9K1LSwMMTjPuWkYa3SJaQCXP16S3Ad9FPo1GGaie7s" Both early buyers (A and B) and their funding wallet transferred funds to this address. So did a wallet from the team's disclosed allocation: "6BUCWrxqUC7C46YnczKksSfLKiEboneE7cE8RzMK2GEq" This wallet received 17.3 million Vibecoin tokens from the team's allocation and sold them on October 13, 2025, at 10:05:48 AM for 16.4 SOL, approximately $3,600. It later transferred 3 SOL on November 3 and 14 SOL on November 26 to the Binance address Szymanski identified. Our investigation further revealed that, on October 6, 2025, a week before the vibecoin pump, both early buyers (A and B) and another wallet transferred money to that same Binance address that Szymanski identified between 3:28 PM and 3:30 PM. These connections point to concealed ownership of wallets A and B that profited from the pump. *The team controlled 36% of vibecoin's total supply* On October 9, 2025, this allocation buying wallet: "8dKE2w28aFzckjohZD89ovzBpkgckv94yMdaydY6TvvA" Purchased approximately 359.7 million Vibecoin tokens, representing 36% of the supply. Those tokens were distributed across roughly 20 wallets subsequently identified as belonging to the team in Szymanski's disclosure. The investigation revealed that during the October 13 pump. One of the team's wallets sold into the pump and made a profit of $3600 while the others held until November 2025 This was a dubious plan by Szymanski and his team who used separate wallets positioned to take profits during the pump while the larger team allocation remained largely untouched. That is why Szymanski's defence about not dumping the entire allocation fails to address the actual fraud. Part 2 in comment session 👇

This is the proof that @Szymansk_ii Deleted his initial first publication 😁😁😁! Baby rugpuller