Senior Analyst, Iran and Oil @EurasiaGroup. Formerly @ISSYale. Author of "The Struggle for Iran" and "Petroleum and Progress in Iran." Views my own.
Joined October 2012
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New pinned tweet, as the links broke for the old one:
"Petroleum and Progress in #Iran: Oil, Development, and the Cold War." cambridge.org/us/academic/su…
"The Struggle for #Iran: Oil, Autocracy, and the Cold War, 1951-1954." uncpress.org/book/9781469671…
Sounds like Bush will be remaining in the Middle East until at least the end of the year, as naval families are told their loved ones won't be home in time for the holidays.
Bush has been deployed since March. ms.now/news/navy-iran-war-us…
In case it wasn't already clear, the 2,000 distance limit is officially in the rearview.
"Iron Gate" appears to be born from frustration.
For the last two months, the US has been pressuring Iran's neighbors, particularly Iraq and Pakistan, to sever overland trade with Iran. So far without major success. So now CENTCOM is getting involved. nytimes.com/2026/11/11/world…
Vance exploring how to make an in-person meeting with Rezaee happen.
He apparently has Trump's blessing, but I don't see what he can offer Rezaee that would move the needle toward a deal.
I also, fwiw, don't really see them getting along. wsj.com/world/middle-east/va…
BREAKING: Authoritarian government in power would like to remain in power.
“ U.S. intelligence indicates that Iran’s hard-line leadership is determined to hold on to power at nearly any cost, according to two officials with direct knowledge of the information, which suggests economic pain alone may not lead to regime change.” nytimes.com/2026/11/10/us/po…
Rezaee reiterates that Iran's HEU will not leave the country. SL Khamenei issued a directive on this in May, per Reuters.
Negotiations don't appear to be making progress, tho Trump and his advisors have signaled that new strikes are no longer likely. reuters.com/world/middle-eas…
"Eventually, you have to eat."
SecState seems unaware that the blockade explicitly exempts humanitarian goods such as food.
Again, would love a more detailed breakdown of how the US sees the blockade forcing Iran's capitulation (beyond citing falling oil exports, inflation, and the value of the rial).
Rubio's comments in the last few days--where he's notably said more about the Iran in public than had been the case for weeks--hint at how he himself sees the conflict.
Perhaps not as one the administration can win--the SecState is not a fool and he likely knows that the pressure campaign's chances of success are slim--but that it can avoid losing.
The "third way" between a deal and more bombing brings the fewest near-term negative consequences: Trump avoids the market reaction that comes with another round of fighting and the political hit of making a deal with Iran.
But the third way isn't really a way at all--Iran is likely to either resist the pressure or lash out more aggressively. axios.com/2026/11/10/trump-i…
The "third way" between a deal and more bombing brings the fewest near-term negative consequences: Trump avoids the market reaction that comes with another round of fighting and the political hit of making a deal with Iran.
But the third way isn't really a way at all--Iran is likely to either resist the pressure or lash out more aggressively. axios.com/2026/11/10/trump-i…
Status quo continues the war--it does not resolve it.
If the US is intent on committing to this course until Iran submits, it must necessarily be prepared to maintain the current escort scheme in the strait on an indefinite basis.
If Iran has not submitted by January 2029, the next administration must commit to the same scheme (unless it is prepared to make a deal).
As in 2025, Iran's missile production capacity has bounced back quite quickly.
Roughly six months after being bombed, Iran is producing 50 missiles per month, roughly half the prewar rate. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
So it's a standoff. Falling risk of escalation, but no scope (yet) for a deal.
US and Iran digging in.
Question has become, once again, who will crack first.
Rubio on the status of negotiations:
"They're demanding pallets of cash, which the president made clear is not going to happen...We're not going to pay.
Iran is demanding reparations. They should be the ones paying reparations because they're the ones that have destabilized the region."
As Trump demurs from new strikes--but also signals little interest in a new deal--Rezaee doubles down.
🎶Chinese music under banyan trees
Here at the dude ranch above the sea
BAAJA
When all my dime dancin' is through
I run to you🎶
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Worth bearing in mind: nothing on the ground has changed since a week ago, when Trump was threatening escalation and Brent was $112. Iran is still hitting ships, US is still operating an escort system, neither side is moving in their negotiating position.
But now, Trump is no longer interested (apparently) in new strikes.
Today's comments (and those of the weekend) suggest that the oil market's optimism was right, in part: Trump's prior enthusiasm for escalation appears to have waned. The odds of a new bombing campaign are receding (though they haven't fallen to zero).
OTOH, sticking with the pressure strategy means Hormuz remains contested, flows remain uneven (and require constant US attention), and the standoff continues, as it has for months.
Trump can act like he's done with the war, but the war is not done with him.
