Your Consumer Bro (@yourconsumerbro) header
Your Consumer Bro (@yourconsumerbro) profile picture

i work in consumer m&a. i break down the earnings, deals, and shelf battles behind everyday brands, and what they mean.

New York, NY
Joined October 2025
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most cpg brands don't have a moat. they have a shelf slot and a renewal date.
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mars plans about $1.4b of us factory spending in 2027, its biggest year yet. the private maker of m&ms and snickers already makes 94% of what it sells in the us right here. the kellanova deal added pringles, cheez-it and more us plants. my read: with tariffs swinging, a plant near the shopper is the hedge. the cheapest tariff is the one you never pay.
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america’s no. 2 grocery retailer by spending share charges you to walk in. costco now captures 8.4% of us food and beverage spending. kroger takes 8.2%, per numerator’s panel for the year through september. for cpg brands, bigger packs need their own packaging, freight and pricing math. but i’d rather own a brand earning healthy margins with heavy costco exposure than one barely breaking even across a beautifully diversified customer base. customer concentration matters. so does having profits to concentrate.
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Your Consumer Bro retweeted
Over 100 of our brands are founder-led growth stage brands - nearly all of them want to exit their businesses, but they all fall into the same trap: They grow too fast And It takes me about 1 second to be able to tell which ones are falling for it You can figure out the ones who are growing too fast by looking at 2 columns on the P&L; revenue and operating income; if ebitda isnt ~5% or higher, and growth is over 60/70%, you're doing it wrong. These founders see brands like Hero Cosmetics, rhode skin, or Coterie growing like weekds, but they tend to not realize that these are very unicorny businesses that are having their cake and eating it too on profitability and growth There are 2 exceptions to what I am about to explain: 1) you are early on in your J curve, fine, but you're not ready to sell now - there's an entire class of capital providers we aptly refer to as 'growth equity' who will invest unprofitable businesses that with steep growth trajectory. The playbook is to find one of these investors, grow some more, find positive ebitda then exiting to a strategic or financial buyer 2) a strategic NEEDS you and is not so much concerned with financial valuations. However if you are planning for a fairway PE exit, you are doing yourself a disservice by pursuing that level of growth, as buyers will generally not give you any credit or value after a certain level of growth. This comes down to a concept conventionally known as 'the rule of 40' - the balance of revenue growth rate + ebitda margin equaling 40, when ebitda is positive. 40, really not THAT high of a number. These days maybe its more like the rule of 50, but the concept prevails: you really only need so much growth; and anything beyond 40 or 50% - most PE buyers are going to look at it and just throw their hands up in the air and say we dont know how to underwrite this said differently: You are SO much better off growing 50%, then 40%, then 35% versus 150%, 50%, 10% It makes the business much more predictable and therefore more underwritable for PE buyers The chart below shows that many recent strategic acquisitions were well in excess of the rule of 40, with strong ebitda all around. If this is you, you'd generally earn a higher exit multiple - brands over the rule of 40 had median 4.5x EV/Sales exit vs sub rule of 40 had 3.3x EV/Sales exits And remember, the brands highlighted below are the best of the best. If you want to maximize optionality and be able to attract the most buyers possible, most founders would be better off focused building real, solid businesses that balance growth with profitability vs. swinging for the fences to become the next brand on this chart. though we do like to see that too :)
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thank you to all our veterans
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cream cheese’s competition isn't just another spread. it's a tub of cottage cheese. us cottage cheese dollar sales rose 17.7% while cream cheese fell 4.4% over the same 52 weeks through october 4, per circana. l catterton’s majority investment reportedly valued good culture above $500m. its ceo says it was meeting less than half of demand. with this tailwind brands in this category are going to rip.
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three big food companies are moving ice cream to specialist owners, or thinking about it. general mills is weighing a sale of häagen-dazs outside north america, per the wall street journal. it's early, and it may keep it. unilever spun off its ice cream business as magnum last december, ben & jerry's included. nestlé is in talks to sell what's left of its ice cream to froneri. the reason is simple. ice cream needs its own frozen trucks, freezers and selling season. cereal and soap need none of that. a brand that needs its own trucks usually ends up with an owner that has them.
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sambazon just bought its way out of being only an açaí brand. sambazon pioneered organic açaí in the u.s. freezer. pitaya foods did the same with dragon fruit, and also sells açaí packs, smoothie bowls and frozen fruit at retailers like costco, target and whole foods. sambazon is buying the company. the founder stays on to run sales. the price wasn't disclosed. what was: the deal is supposed to lift sambazon's grocery reach by 20%, to nearly 70% of u.s. stores. frozen fruit is one of the few grocery categories still growing in units. açaí stays the anchor. the bet is that the smoothie aisle now pays more for a tropical platform than for another one-fruit brand.
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Your Consumer Bro retweeted
Good things come to those who invest in CPG.
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hain's turnaround is in the lenders' hands now, not the brands'. hain makes celestial tea, earth's best baby food and greek gods yogurt. to pay down debt, it agreed to sell its international business, including ella's kitchen, for $323m. regulators approved the sale. the lenders haven't. the deadline to extend hain's debt, which comes due in december, passed without a deal. now the buyer can walk away. hain can't. and even if it closes, the sale only covers about half of hain's $586m of debt. that's why the brands barely matter right now. sales are still shrinking, and there was no q&a on the earnings call. the only priority is december. when the debt comes due before the turnaround, the lenders call the shots.
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everyone's fighting over the protein powder aisle. scoops went to the peanut butter aisle instead. lots of foot traffic, one old peanut powder incumbent, almost no new products. target reportedly gave it 1,000+ doors after it pitched for 500. sometimes the best growth move is picking a less crowded shelf.
High-protein peanut powder brand Scoops just secured $2M in seed funding. The round was led by James Weil and included participation from the company's manufacturer and ingredient supplier. Founded by Elizabeth Lane, a former ops exec at Magic Spoon and Huel, Scoops is powered by peanut protein isolate which delivers 27g of protein, 5g of fiber, 3g of sugar, and 75% fewer calories than peanut butter. The company has accomplished a lot since debuting in April. Scoops secured nationwide distribution at Target and has scaled quickly on Amazon and TikTok Shop.
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plenty of buyers. still no deal. four things that can stall a consumer deal, even when the interest is real: 1. valuation gaps the seller prices in the next stage of growth. the buyer won't pay for all of it upfront. both can like the business and still disagree on the price. 2. budgets that start slipping the business starts missing its forecast while buyers are reviewing it. buyers lower what they expect it to earn, and the price they can justify falls with it. 3. customer concentration one retailer accounts for a large share of sales. a lost listing, a smaller order or tougher terms could change the earnings. the buyer has to price that dependence, even if the account stays. 4. falling category consumption the brand is taking share, but people are buying fewer units of the whole category. gaining share doesn't guarantee selling more, which makes the growth plan harder to justify. buyer interest starts the process. agreement on price and risk closes it.
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the poppi founders sold one brand. now they're betting $2.5m of their own money on another. jetty, their new hydration brand, launches today at whole foods nationwide plus target.com and amazon. the interesting part is the playbook. poppi took a boring category and made it feel new. hydration is crowded, but the founders already know how to get a drink noticed, stocked and talked about. self-funding also changes the math. no investors means no pressure to grow at any cost, and the founders keep the upside if it works.
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just started my chess journey. no experience playing when I was younger. any tips from those who are experienced? things to focus on etc.
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Your Consumer Bro retweeted
my controversial cpg takes: 1. most food brands need better shelf placement, not a community. 2. a good store brand is a problem for brands whose only advantage is a familiar logo. 3. selling your brand early isn't selling out. the buyer's distribution might do more than your next funding round.
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imagine being jensen huang and having your personal life become a systemic risk to the global economy after you have an affair with a chinese spy.
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bessemer venture partners showcases their anti-portfolio – a collection of companies they passed on
vc investment committees should put names next to every veto. you want credit for picking winners? i want to know which ones you blocked too.
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enough with the white monster. ghost is by far the best tasting energy drink. (i have the tastebuds of a 12 year old)
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the case for one rock's coffee deal isn't that maxwell house becomes trendy. it's that the price could make a mature business worth owning. kraft heinz has agreed to a deal valuing its north america coffee business at $650m, while keeping 30%.
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maxwell house and gevalia don't need explosive growth to be valuable. repeat purchases can support a good business even when the brands aren't fashionable. that's the buyer thesis: if demand stabilizes and cash holds up, the return needn't depend on a big growth comeback.
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the catch is what those sales earn. coffee costs, plant spending and standalone expenses could swallow the apparent bargain. earnings weren't disclosed, and closing is expected in mid-2027. i like the price-led thesis. the cash flow still has to prove it.
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