Senior Analyst @c4ads. Upstream Russian defense industry supply and production chain watcher. Views are my own, not my employer's. Retweets ≠ endorsement.
The Sprawl
Joined March 2025
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US asks Russia to agree to NATO-like backing for Ukraine politi.co/4etNOnf
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Difficult to bring credible pressure on Russia without addressing China's role as defense industrial enabler. Pressure on Russia alone is unlikely to produce results.
This latest statement is an improvement on the previous one. But while the US keeps issuing statements & offers, Russia sits on its maximalist positions. Without credible pressure on Russia, they will continue to so sit.
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Coverage of my latest for @C4ADS from @BillGertz via @WashTimes. You can read my findings on Sino-Russian ACW cooperation here: c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage….
I think some people are dramatically overestimating their ability to predict how this particular president will interact with Congress on foreign policy matters. It's technically true that the executive typically holds the cards in that arena. But this is not a typical executive.
Agree. I think some people are dramatically overestimating the real power congress has to check the president's actions.
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Grateful to see @bbcchinese cover my latest for @C4ADS. Mainland Chinese enablers need to understand that their dealings with Russian defense industry actors remain under scrutiny. These dealings *will* be added to the record.
@bbcchinese cites our new report: Over half of high-priority semiconductor shipments to Russia (Feb 2022–Dec 2024) came from Chinese senders. But China’s "technological nationalism" limits this partnership, which extends well beyond the transfer of dual-use tech.
Read 👇
bbc.com/zhongwen/articles/c9…
Tolerating transfers of Western-origin chipmaking equipment to China risks allowing Russia to access that equipment, whether directly or indirectly. Good move by USG, if accurate. From my latest report for @C4ADS:
US OFFICIALS HAVE HELD UP APPROVAL FOR AMERICAN CHIPMAKING EQUIPMENT NEEDED BY SK HYNIX TO EXPAND PRODUCTION IN CHINA - PEOPLE FAMILIAR SAY
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There's very little reason for Putin to engage in diplomacy over Ukraine so long as China continues to shore up the Russian defense industry. And there's no reason for Beijing to rein in that support if no consequences materialize for those Chinese enablers.
Китайская компания предлагает российским военным оптоволокно длиной до 100 км и дроны-перехватчики с ИИ-наведением — расследование storage.googleapis.com/plmrp…
We @C4ADS tracked submarine-related transfers between Russia's Rubin Design Bureau and China State Shipbuilding Corporation in our most recent report. The transfers in question included tests related to cavitation - a concern for sub quieting efforts. c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage…
America’s undersea advantage is no guarantee. China is working to narrow it.
Randy Schriver & @michael_kuiken joined @bill_hamblet on @NavalInstitute Proceedings podcast to discuss China detecting U.S. subs, quantum sensing, & shipbuilding.
🎧 Listen: youtu.be/sgSK0aoxd-Q?si=W14a…
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A keen observation from Sarah Paine & Anand Toprani. Sanctions tailored in combination with other statecraft measures can deliver positive results. But those results take time to materialize and can be difficult to measure-easy fodder for lazy criticism. foreignaffairs.com/united-st…
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Many lingering mysteries from these transfers. One that lingers: post-2022 transfers of wind tunnel test data for a flying wing design between Chinese land systems major Norinco and Russia's TsAGI. Rosoboronexport was involved, so military use presumed. But what was it for?
Curious to learn more about Megaspeed's role in diverting Nvidia chip diversion to China? If you haven't read @C4ADS' Covert Compute already - do it. c4ads.org/reports/covert-com…
Tremendous passage from Gideon Lewis-Krauss on the very human artisanal yet otherworldly craft underpinning modern semiconductor production.
They power our phones, cars, dishwashers—and the A.I. systems that prop up the economy. They’re also at the heart of fierce geopolitical rivalry. newyorker.com/magazine/2026/…
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One of my favorite case studies from this report is about Russian machine tool maker Stankomashstroy, which committed to opening a plant in China's Shaanxi Province in 2023. Stankomashstroy's owner visited China two days before my report went live. stankomashstroy.ru/2026/10/2…
NEW: China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership weeks before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Our latest analysis digs into academic publications, corporate filings, and trade records to map their collaboration on advanced conventional weapons — and suggests the relationship is far from equal. 🧵 1/7
Read A Marriage of Convenience? 👇
c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage…
Has @TheEconomist's survey of Sino-Russian military cooperation left you thirsting for more content on that theme? Friend, look no further - I've written an entire report on the upstream dimension of that relationship: c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage…
China has not fought a war in decades. To conquer Taiwan, it needs the latest battlefield lessons and data to compensate for its lack of combat experience. That is where Russia comes in economist.com/briefing/2026/…
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Very pleased to see @SvobodaRadio take up this most interesting academic partnership. Special thanks to @pustota for diving so deeply into the parties involved. 🙏
Американская исследовательская группа Center for Advanced Defense Studies (C4ADS) подготовила доклад о военно-технологических связях между Россией и Китаем за последнее десятилетие. "Система" участвовала в работе над этим документом.
В последние годы Китай все меньше заинтересован в приобретении готовых российских вооружений как для использования в своей армии, так и для обратного инжиниринга или копирования. Баланс смещается в обратную сторону: российская военная промышленность все сильнее зависит от китайской электроники и станков. Однако в некоторых случаях Китай приобретает в России отдельные военные технологии, связанные с подводными лодками и ракетами, а также использует российские возможности для испытаний своего оружия.
Россия по-прежнему не утратила своей привлекательности для Пекина как кузница кадров благодаря нескольким сильным научным и учебным центрам, связанным с российским ВПК. После 2022 года самым популярным направлением сотрудничества стали системы управления БПЛА, в том числе с помощью ИИ.
Сотрудник одной из кафедр МГТУ имени Баумана, активно сотрудничающей с Китаем, был застрелен в 2024 году в лесу в Подмосковье, предположительно, в ходе операции ГУР Украины. Его называли одним из главных в России идеологов использования искусственного интеллекта для управления дронами.
smarturl.click/0O5gVL
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Curious to learn more about how Chinese defense industry entities and affiliated universities partner with Russian scientists to advance frontier defense technologies? Check out @pustota's latest (svoboda.org/a/rossiya-uchit-…) for @SvobodaRadio plus my own research for @C4ADS (1/2)
One of the biggest themes in Chinese science & tech policy is the push to get academia and industry to work more together on innovation. But ultimately enterprises should lead.
"National science and technology projects with clearly defined industrial application goals should, in principle, be led by enterprises, which should also take the lead in commercializing the resulting technologies."
产业应用目标明确的国家科技计划项目，原则上由企业牵头实施并主导成果转化。
Quality reporting from @the_ins_ru per usual. Notable also that Element has also begun importing Chinese chipmaking equipment, probably in support of the United Microelectronics Company strategy. xitter.twitterapi.xyz/zerkzal/status/2113273…
На должность главы Российской микроэлектронной корпорации претендует руководитель оборонного НИИ. Он попал под санкции ЕС десять дней назад storage.googleapis.com/plmrp…
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I also cover other elements (ha) of Element's integration into Chinese chip production/supply chains in my new report for C4ADS. You can peruse my findings here: c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage….
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I spent the past year studying 🇨🇳-🇷🇺 cooperation related to advanced conventional weapons - not only through military-technical cooperation, but also through supply/production chain integration and academic partnerships. Proud to see this go live; I hope you'll take a look.
NEW: China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership weeks before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Our latest analysis digs into academic publications, corporate filings, and trade records to map their collaboration on advanced conventional weapons — and suggests the relationship is far from equal. 🧵 1/7
Read A Marriage of Convenience? 👇
c4ads.org/reports/a-marriage…
20240409-12: Microelectronika 2024 forum: D.S. Veselov of Element subsidiary Nanotronica reports company's incorporation of a Chinese subsidiary as part of initiative to attract "foreign specialists" and other staff from abroad. cnews.ru/news/top/2025-04-07…
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EU efforts to negotiate chip-related export controls with China contradict this week's EU sanctions on Russian chipmakers. Element (largest RU chipmaker) is integrating itself into Chinese chipmaking supply chains, including importing Chinese fabrication equipment. If Brussels frees up ASML to operate in Chinese market, there's a real risk of Russia simply offshoring chip fabrication to China. Element's already exploring that option.
cnews.ru/news/top/2026-09-30…
The European Union is in talks with China to secure relief from sanctions on Germany's Sindlhauser Materials, a key supplier to ASML bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
