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Security researcher 🇦🇺 Good-faith hacking 🤡 Weaponizing source code 🧬 https://xitter.twitterapi.xyz/t.co/qulkQaGWp9

Joined June 2020
Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)Photo by Sick.Codes (@sickcodes)
Sick.Codes retweeted
Respectfully, get fucked.
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PSIRTs out there asking for exploit code
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when she got the thinkpad panties on you know i’m playing with that clickoris
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Sick.Codes retweeted
Planned to drop a macOS 0day at OffensiveCon 2026 in Berlin 5 months ago. Submitted it to Apple 3 years ago, and Apple confirmed the vulnerability but closed the report. it's a universal method to bypass many security protections on macOS and you can fully bypass TCC and gain other privileged access as you want, easilly weaponized. Although I mentioned the impact multiple times, there were no updates for the next 2 years until my presentation was accepted by OffensiveCon26 Berlin. Apple asked me to hold off on disclosure and not disclose the vulnerability at OffensiveCon26 Berlin, saying a patch would be released in macOS 27 in Fall 2026. They also mentioned "bounty" multiple times. Honestly, I did have some complaints because their workflow was really bad. No updates at all until disclosure was about to happen. But as long as they decided to patch it, I was willing to wait, even without a bug bounty, for user safety. If Apple wasn't going to release a patch for 3 years, I'd disclose the vulnerability so EDR vendors could protect users too. But in September, when the vulnerability was patched, there was no cve, no credit, and no bounty. I really don't get why apple chose to handle it in such a dishonest and underhanded way, a cheat. Even if they had never mentioned a bounty, I still would have held off on disclosure because they were going to publish a security bulletin. this is a huge disappointment in my experience with the Apple Security Bounty program. never thought I'd encounter something like this. As i said on my blog a few years ago, my experience with ASB had been positive. that's why I was willing to wait for the patch even without a bounty, but not to be cheated like this
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Just released a secure boot bypass (bootloader unlocked) for the Chromecast with Google TV 4K yet again! Full writeup, exploit, and tooling: lnkd.in/eAhXWbsV #HardwareSecurity #AndroidSecurity #FirmwareSecurity #SecurityResearch #OpenSource
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Sick.Codes retweeted
Now kiss
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Sick.Codes retweeted
thank you claude
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messaging my wife a link containing proof of her husband cheating on her from an anonymous instagram account and then when she clicks on it texting her to let her know she failed the family phishing test and she has to retake my cybersecurity course
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I have been running a wordpress blog for april fools 2023 raisistance.com. Has it been pwned with php2shell? 🧵 1/X
If we are not seeing mass exploitation of php2shell, it's not because the exploit is not easy. It's because threat actors are apparently absolute dumbasses, or don't make enough money to afford a Codex subscription.
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Everyone who owns hardware with abominable software (like Sonos players) owes a debt of gratitude to Venkatraman Srinivasan and the rest of the eMudhra gang in Bengaluru, Karnataka. Without their gross negligence, it'd be a lot harder to counterfeit certificates and fix the sw🙏
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Sick.Codes retweeted
just dawned on me 90% of smart devices for sale this 2026 black friday will be vulnerable to certificate forgery
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Released full source for an autonomous root chain on TCL 50C721 Android TV — CVE-2022-22706 Mali GPU page-cache write → uid=0 in <2s from unprivileged app context. Ad blocking, debloat, SELinux hardening. No prebuilt binaries. gitlab.com/c4psu13/mali-page…
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Meet Kimi K3.1 Pro, our most capable 3T-class model.
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Slop wars 🍿
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Been getting into opsec due to recent events
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-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- 4 -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
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To teach a lesson, After Wiz rushed to buy php2shell domain and use its marketing machine to steal the spotlight, I spotted "phpbleed" in a recent Calif tweet and bought phpbleed.com before wiz could pull the same stunt again. A big budget can buy a domain. It shouldn't buy someone else's research credit. If you have contacts at CISA or in the press, do the right thing: make sure the researchers who actually did the work get the recognition they deserve. Hack the planet. Credit the researchers.
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Sick.Codes retweeted
PHP defenders right now:
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UPDATE: I can confirm that the Ledger supply chain is compromised in Europe as well. @Ledger should initiate an immediate product recall to protect users. I just purchased a second device from a different Mediamarkt location today, recorded the unboxing process, and discovered spyware once again (video linked in the second tweet). The device was compromised in the exact same manner, featuring identical modifications (such as additional cables and an LTE module). This indicates its a widespread issue rather than an isolated incident, potentially affecting Ledger inventory across MediaMarkt and Saturn stores throughout Europe (comprising over 1,000 stores across 11 countries). My initial hypothesis was that these devices were returns that looked unopened to the employees and were just sold again as new however, a MediaMarkt employee confirmed that the device I purchased was not a return, and that returned Ledgers are sent directly back to the manufacturer rather than resold. Store records show the inventory originated from Aqipa GmbH. While Ledger's CTO was unsure if Aqipa serves as the direct distributor between Ledger and MediaMarkt, it appears to be the case. Given that Aqipa distributes across Europe, any physical retail store receiving stock through them may be at risk. I sent the first ledger to mark and the second one is going to ledger now, so that they can analyse it. If you purchased a ledger from anyone other than the official ledger store, make sure to check your device!!
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